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ABSTRACT: Democracy’s resilience is being put to the test by the 21st century. The impact 
of  globalisation and digitalisation has disenfranchised many but so have traditional democratic 
practices. In an era of  constant and immediate communication, with society embracing technological 
advances while struggling to cope with its inadvertent effects, democracy is still tethered to traditional 
practices that limit citizens’ roles to casting their ballots every few years. However, theory is now 
being put to the test and experiments with digital democracy are popping up across the globe. In this 
article, we cover three participative democracy instruments, namely the European Citizens Initiative, 
e-Voting and e-Participatory Budgeting, delving into their potential and identifying their limitations, 
in the context of  the European Union. We also cover the unforeseen threats to democracy posed by 
information security issues and social media.
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1. Introduction
Turbulence is on the rise across the democratic world. Democracy and its 
institutions are wounded. Not just bruises, but punctures which keep festering, easily 
spreading the disease. There are many reasons that we could adduce to justify its state 
and most of  them essentially boil down to the increased effects of  globalisation and 
the disillusionment of  citizens with democratic life.
Globalisation, which has widened the rift between fellow countryman, that has 
pitted the “bigot redneck” against the “out-of-touch liberal elites”, the country folk against 
the city dwellers, the working men and women against the “subsidized parasites”.1 The 
disillusionment with democratic life, resulting from years of  stagnant economic 
growth for the low and middle class, corruption scandals involving the highest 
political offices, the feeling that basic wants and needs go unheard by elected officials 
and the polarization of  political discourse, push a great many to the extremes of  the 
political spectrum where the deceivingly warm embrace of  avid agitators awaits.
One can only conclude that we were taken by surprise (even though the telltale 
signs were there). Yasha Mounk notes how “liberal democracy” was declared triumphant 
in the late 1980’s, how we thought it was so deeply rooted in the world’s democratic 
bastions that we rested, assured that the future would not be too different or more 
unstable than the present was… Then, the future arrived, and it was not what we 
expected.2
Three paragraphs are enough to paint a very bleak picture. The rest of  this 
paper will change focus and try to shed some light on the way forward, towards a 
more promising future. We intend to show how the European Union (“EU”) can 
answer some of  the issues we have highlighted, what it has done so far and what we 
view as the best starting point for the reinforcement of  the democratic values that 
lay at the core of  the EU. We will do so by reference to the main initiatives that have 
been designed in the context of  digital democracy,3 providing an overview of  the 
measures that have so far been implemented and their results, discussing additional 
possibilities and detailing the potential barriers or threats to their implementation 
and to online democratic life.
The EU gathers essential elements that make it a prime candidate to experiment 
with new ways of  looking at and experiencing democracy. From its inception, it has 
been an experiment in a new way for society to organise itself, for public power to be 
structured and for nations to come together in the pursuit of  common objectives. In 
this context, equating new methods to reinvent democracy and reconfigure the way 
public powers direct their efforts to meet the needs of  citizens is not only desirable 
but could be vital for the prospering and survival of  the European project.
The EU can be perceived as a form of  deterritorialisation (of  power), based 
on how the EU’s institutions exercise their powers within the confines of  a fluid 
attribution of  competences, conceded by and shared with its Member States. This 
exercise of  power often brings it closer to its citizens and often draws it back 
1 Paul Collier, O Futuro do capitalismo – enfrentar as novas ansiedades (Alfragide: Dom Quixote, 2019), 13-19.
2 Yascha Mounk, Povo vs. Democracia (Alfragide: Lua de Papel, 2019), 7-26.
3 We will mainly refer to the expression “digital democracy” as opposed to “electronic democracy” or 
“e-democracy”, used by a sizeable portion of  the literature in the matter, as we believe it translates more 
clearly the connection between these processes and the internet-based tools that given them form. At 
certain points we will make reference to some of  the solutions with the prefix “e” for ease of  reference 
regarding the cited literature or to better distinguish the online methods from the offline ones.
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from them, to give room for Member States to fulfil their attributions. Noting 
how deterritorialisation is a defining feature of  the current globalisation dynamics, 
Alessandra Silveira and Pedro Madeira Froufe highlight the fact that we seem to be 
reaching a new frontier in the organisation of  public powers, which will necessarily 
require that we rethink the way we “think, act and interact” with public powers, even 
more so considering the rise of  digital tools which provide for instant and global 
communication.4 In this context, they see, much to our agreeance, that the fluidity 
and malleability of  the partitioning of  powers and competences that is characteristic 
of  the EU’s institutions (between themselves and in relation to the Member States) is 
more adequate to answer the challenges that globalisation has brought about.5
This new frontier will certainly have to reflect innovative versions of  democratic 
interaction. We would argue that that evolution has already started, that it is ongoing. 
We have witnessed it, from its earliest forms, envisaged as direct democracy, evolving 
to representative democracy – as an answer to the increasing complexity of  society 
and the relations that are established in its midst –, to the emergence of  participatory 
democracy, as a complement to representativeness, seeking to engage citizens in the 
decision-making processes which tend to affect them more directly.6 This seems to 
be the trend of  evolution in the field and is the corner stone of  the methods we will 
review.
As a final note, we would like to highlight the internet’s potential to be the 
medium by which democracy might realize this latest stage of  its evolution. To that 
effect, we borrow Dipayan Ghosh’s words: “the internet – and, more basically, connectivity 
– will persistently find ways to break inefficient and ineffective institutions; it is in the internet’s 
nature to tear down artificially imposed barriers by reaping the benefits of  its low transaction costs 
and minimised friction, challenging aging methods, industries, governmental regimes, and political 
systems in the process”.7
2. Digital democracy instruments
Having established how the EU is best placed to experiment with new forms 
of  democracy, and how the internet can be a driving force behind the efforts to give 
shape to participative democracy, we will now dive into the more technical aspects 
of  the discussion.
Definitions of  digital democracy vary greatly in literature and are intrinsically 
connected to the view of  democracy and decision-making processes espoused by any 
given political system. The dominant view focuses on conceptions of  participatory 
and deliberative democracy (here understood as those systems that privilege the 
creation of  spaces for rational and fair public deliberation of  issues).8 From these 
4 Alessandra Silveira and Pedro Madeira Froufe, “A teoria da organização jurídica dos sistemas 
federativos e o desafio da desterritorialização do poder: qual o papel da experiência federativa 
europeia?”, in Federalismo em tempos de renacionalização (Coimbra: Almedina, 2019), 167-190.
5 Alessandra Silveira and Pedro Madeira Froufe, “A teoria da organização jurídica dos sistemas 
federativos”, 187.
6 Alessandra Silveira, Princípios de direito da União Europeia. Doutrina e jurisprudência (Lisbon: Quid Iuris, 
2011), 51-52.
7 Dipayan Gosh, Terms of  disservice: how Silicon Valley is destructive by design (Washington: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2020), ebook edition.
8 Ralph Linder and Georg Aichholzer, “e-Democracy: conceptual foundations and recent trends”, 
in European e-Democracy in practice, eds. Leonhard Hennen et al. (Cham: Springer, 2020), https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-3-030-27184-8.
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different perspectives, results caused divergent views on the contributions that digital 
tools can have in the context of  democratic participation, with some reserving special 
focus to the information potential that digital tools present, while others dedicate 
special interest to the participatory possibilities in decision-making that the internet-
based systems have.9
In the next sections we will review three mechanisms, focusing on e-petitioning, 
e-voting and e-participatory budgeting, selected due to their specific characteristics 
which allow for greater interaction on the decision-making process as a whole and 
the legislative process in particular.10 For the moment, it suffices to align ourselves 
with one of  the simplest and broader definitions of  digital democracy that Ralf  
Linder and Georg Aichholzer identify in their review: “Digital democracy can be defined 
as the pursuit and the practice of  democracy in whatever view using digital media in online and 
offline political communication”.11
2.1. E-petitioning: the European Citizens Initiative 
The Treaty on European Union (“TEU”), in its Preamble, sets out the objective 
of  “creating an ever closer union among the peoples of  Europe, in which decisions are taken as 
closely as possible to the citizen”. This purpose is one of  the defining distinctive features 
that make the EU more than an international organisation focusing on mere regional 
cooperation. It is in looking to fulfil this objective that nationals of  Member States 
have witnessed the recognition, in their favor, of  social and political rights, which 
have been condensed to form the EU Citizenship.12 With the dawn of  the EU 
Citizenship, the EU institutions were faced with the need to give effect to those 
political rights, and special focus was given to bridging the gap between the citizens 
and the EU institutions themselves.  
Article 11 TEU lays out the obligations impending on the EU institutions in 
this regard, whereby the EU institutions will give an opportunity to citizens and their 
representative associations to make their views publicly known, allow for the open 
exchange of  those positions, and maintain an “open, transparent and regular dialogue” 
with their representative associations and civil society.
As regards the European Commission (“Commission”), the obligations 
impeding on this institution are more specific. The Commission is obliged to conduct 
“broad consultations with the parties concerned” and, more relevantly to the present study, 
upon the initiative of  at least one million citizens of  a significant number of  Member 
States, submit a proposal for the adoption of  a legal act for the purpose of  attaining 
an objective of  the Treaties.
9 Ralph Linder and Georg Aichholzer, “e-Democracy: conceptual foundations and recent trends”, 
12-23. 
10 We will not cover the issue of  consultations in this paper. While their impact on the legislative 
process is quite considerable, the subject matter of  these consultation tends to be so specialized and 
technical in nature that inputs from the “common” citizen are infrequent. Another topic that will fall 
outside our scope, this one for restrictions of  space, is the Petitioning of  the European Parliament, a 
subject to which we will make only brief  reference.
11 Jan van Dijk, “Digital democracy: vision and reality”, in Public Administration in the information age: revisited 
(Amsterdam: IOS-Press, 2012) seen in Leonard Hennen et al., European e-Democracy in practice, 16.
12 Providing a view on the evolution, the concept of  EU citizenship and the implications of  its 
recognition, see Alessandra Silveira, “Cidadania europeia e direitos fundamentais”, in Direito da União 
Europeia – elementos de direito e políticas da União (Coimbra: Almedina, 2016), 17-72.
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The European Citizens Initiative (“ECI”) is the result of  the formalisation of  
the procedure – as was required by Article 24 of  the Treaty on the Functioning of  
the European Union (“TFEU”) – which translated first in the adoption of  Regulation 
211/2011, then updated, repealed and replaced by Regulation 2019/788.13 It is the first 
initiative of  its kind, being hailed as the first supranational citizens’ initiative14 and, in 
fact, the first transnational instrument of  participatory democracy.15
As the right of  legislative initiative lies with the Commission (thought the European 
Parliament and the Council of  the European Union might request the proposition of  
specific legislation16) the ECI is essentially a mechanism at the disposal of  the EU 
citizens to entice the Commission to act in the pursuit of  a Treaty objective, with a view 
to enact legislation. The ECI requires that a group of  organizers consisting of  at least 7 
EU citizens, residing in at least 7 different Member States, of  age to be entitled to vote 
in elections for the European Parliament, register an initiative with the Commission. 
The Commission is entitled to refuse the registration of  an initiative if: 1) it does not 
fulfil the technical requirements set out in Article 6 (3) (a) and (b) Regulation 2019/788; 
2) the initiative (or parts of  it) falls outside the scope of  the Commission’s powers to 
submit a proposal for a legal act of  the Union with the purpose of  implementing the 
Treaties; 3) the initiative is manifestly abusive, frivolous or vexatious; or, 4) the initiative 
is manifestly contrary to the values of  the Union (as set out in Article 2 TEU and the 
Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  the European Union). Upon confirmation of  these 
requirements, the initiative is registered and made public. In the cases in which the 
parts of  the initiative fall outside the scope of  the Commissions powers, as outlined 
in Article 6 (3) (c) Regulation 2019/788, and after an invitation by the Commission to 
amend it, the organisers might choose to maintain its full content, in which case the 
Commission might decide to partially register the initiative.
For an initiative to be successful it needs to gather at least 1 million signatures 
from EU citizens, from at least one quarter of  the Member States and meeting the 
minimum number of  signatures per country as defined in Annex I of  the Regulation. 
The collection of  signatures last for 12 months and starts on the date specified by 
the organisers, which should, nevertheless, be within 6 months of  the registration of  
the ECI. The signatures, known as statements of  support, may be collected in paper 
format or through online collection systems. As of  2020, the Commission has set 
up one such system that the organisers may use free of  charge, in which supporters 
may register the statements by means of  notified electronic identification. Alternatively, 
the organisers may use other collection systems. When they opt for that system, the 
organisers must upload the paper signatures to the central online collection system 
hosted by the Commission. Member States must validate the signatures (both paper 
and online) within the 3 months following the submission by the organisers to the 
competent authorities of  each of  the Member States in which signatures were collected.
13 Regulation 2019/788 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  17 April 2019 on the 
European citizens’ initiative.
14 Maximilian Conrad, “The European citizens’ initiative: transnational democracy in the EU at 
last?”, Icelandic Review of  Politics & Administration, v. 7, no. 1 (2011): 5-22, http://www.irpa.is/article/
view/a.2011.7.1.1/pdf_206. 
15 Georg Aichholzer and Gloria Rose, “Experience with digital tools in different types of  
e-Participation”, in European e-Democracy in practice, 120.
16 Tiago Sérgio Cabral, “A short guide to the legislative procedure in the European Union”, UNIO – 
EU Law Journal, v. 6, no. 1, (2020): 161-180.
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At this stage, if  the required number of  validated statements has been reached, 
the Commission will notify it to the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee, the Committee of  the Regions, the national Parliaments, and the 
European Parliament, which will host a public hearing in which the organisers may 
present the initiative. This is followed by a meeting with the Commission in which 
the organisers get a chance to provide additional details on the initiative. Within 6 
months of  the public hearing held at the European Parliament, the Commission shall 
inform the organisers of  whether it intends to pursue any action and the timelines 
for said action in the affirmative, providing a reason for the refusal to take action.
From the above description, it is easy to note how difficult it might be to see 
an initiative reach the required number of  signatures, much less to reach the stage 
where the Commission decides on whether it will act or not. This difficulty has 
been noted in many studies, and the most frequent conclusion is that the apparatus 
required to engage in an ECI is usually restricted to civil society organisations, which, 
due to their established structures, can reach a wider European audience.17 While 
digital tools facilitate this exercise to some extent (two thirds of  the petitions use 
online collection systems),18 aiding not only with the collection process, but also with 
the associated campaigning, it does not seem that they go a long way in making it 
an accessible means to a group of  “average” citizens. This is further compounded 
by the heavy costs of  setting up the campaigning operation which, to be successful, 
demands that organisers make their platforms available in as many languages as 
possible (this is, in fact, a recurring issue in the context of  implementing digital 
democracy tools in the EU).
While the ECI seems to have contributed to a reinforcement of  civil society 
organisations, allowing for greater access to the EU Institutions for those that are 
not based in Brussels,19 it seems it might have fallen short of  the expectations that 
surrounded it, having only a marginal effect on the involvement of  the average EU 
citizen.
2.2. E-voting: how suitable for the EU?
E-voting is the more direct form of  participatory digital democracy that has 
so far been experimented. None of  these experiments were conducted at EU level 
and, as it stands, only one Member State (Estonia) has definitively implemented this 
form of  suffrage. Estonia is singled out in almost every piece of  recent literature in 
the context of  online voting, having made this modality available in all the elections 
(local, national and for the European Parliament), with 31% of  the total number of  
votes being casted online in the 2015 elections.20
The Estonian success with online voting must be read considering the country’s 
specific context. Following the fall of  the Soviet Union, the Estonian Government 
started a great push towards digitalisation, a series of  government programs that 
resulted in the availability of  computers with internet access in all schools and 
17 Georg Aichholzer and Gloria Rose, “Experience with digital tools in different types of  
e-Participation”, 120.
18 Georg Aichholzer and Gloria Rose, “Experience with digital tools in different types of  
e-Participation”, 122.
19 Georg Aichholzer and Gloria Rose, “Experience with digital tools in different types of  
e-Participation”, 120.
20 Aleksandr Lust, “I-Vote, therefore I am? Internet voting in Switzerland and Estonia”, SAIS Review 
of  International Affairs, v. 38, no. 1 (2018): 65-79, https://doi.org/10.1353/sais.2018.0006.  
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partnerships with private entities having free access to wireless internet in all public 
spaces. This was coupled with an immense investment in e-government solutions, 
resulting in many services being accessible online via a digital ID card. As a result, 
79% of  Estonians are frequent internet users.21
Another example that is usually coupled with Estonia is that of  Switzerland 
which, since the mid-2000s, experimented with online voting in 3 cantons (Geneva, 
Neuchatel and Zurich) for cantonal and federal referenda. Switzerland has seen a lot 
of  back and forth in this area. Initially only allowing for referenda to be voted on, 
this was expanded to cover also federal elections in the first 2 cantons, while 12 other 
cantons had that possibility made available only to Swiss nationals living abroad. As 
for Zurich, a moratorium was imposed on online voting in 2011.22
The debate around the issue in Switzerland has been intense and recently 
resulted in the withdrawal of  the 2 e-voting systems that were available in the 
country (one hosted by the Geneva canton and another by Swiss Post), mostly for 
security concerns.23 Notwithstanding that, the comparison undertaken by Lust of  
the results in these 2 countries still allows us to gather some insights. Noting the 
strong democratic tradition of  the country (the average Swiss is called to the ballot 
box 6/7 times a year to vote on elections or referenda), Lust goes on to highlight 
how the country has long struggled with low voter turnout (this is in part connected 
to the late extension of  suffrage to women – extension entered into force in 1970s 
– which seems to have resulted in low numbers of  women votes). To invert this 
trend the government introduced postal voting in the 1980s to which many Swiss 
adhered to and remains the most used modality (80% of  Swiss voters vote by mail). 
The initiative resulted in a 5% increase in turnout. Spectators had high hopes for 
the introduction of  e-voting, expecting a similar boom in voter turnout, especially 
amongst the younger electors. The hope, however, did not translate into reality, with 
voter turnout stagnating at the same level as previous elections and e-voting effects 
being negligible24 and resulted in no sustained increase in young voter turnout.25
A final note regarding this study is the impact on demographics and political bias. 
A common assertion is that the public which will flock to e-voting is predominantly 
male, rich and with higher education.26 Lust noted that, while this seems to be true 
in the years ensuing the introduction of  e-voting, this trend tends to change, with 
demographics losing importance but being, however, replaced by two other biases: 
internet/computer skills and trust in the online voting.
As regards political bias, Lust noted that in Switzerland, given the overall support 
of  the political system and the reduced impact of  demographic differences overtime, 
there was no bias towards voting in one party/political family. The same could not 
be said about Estonia where a major mistrust by ethnic Russians regarding e-voting 
(the relation between ethnic Russians and ethnic Estonians as long since been frayed, 
the mistrust regarding the e-voting system was compounded by the fact that the 
21 Aleksander Lust, “I-Vote, therefore I am?”, 71.
22 Aleksander Lust, “I-Vote, therefore I am?”, 69.
23 See Federal Chancellery website, accessed 31 January 2021, https://www.bk.admin.ch/bk/en/
home/politische-rechte/e-voting.html. 
24 Aleksander Lust, “I-Vote, therefore I am?”, 69-71.
25 Georg Aichholzer and Gloria Rose, “Experience with digital tools in different types of  
e-Participation”, 111.
26 Georg Aichholzer and Gloria Rose, “Experience with digital tools in different types of  
e-Participation”, 111.
® UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL Vol. 7, No. 1,  July 2021
74 Miguel Pereira
early versions of  the systems provided only for Estonian language settings), resulted 
in some parties, usual recipients of  the votes of  this slice of  Estonian society, being 
underrepresented in online voting.
A central argument in support of  e-voting is that it contributes to increased 
turnout (the other two most adduced arguments are decreased cost with elections 
and reduced mistakes in tallying the votes). This argument, however, finds limited 
sustenance in empirical evidence, as we have seen. Considering the pilot projects carried 
out in several EU Member States, no increase in turnout was detected (though interest 
in the particular elections is a fact to be considered in reviewing the results, not just 
the method by which voters cast their ballots).27 If  there is anything to learn from the 
Estonian experience, it is that digital literacy and trust in e-government solutions seem 
to have an impact on the successful implementation of  online voting, though special 
attention must be paid to representation in order to avoid a divide on the participation 
of  different electorates that might lead to questioning the legitimacy of  the results.
So far, we have highlighted the importance of  trust in computer systems if  
e-voting is to be successfully incorporated into the electoral system of  a given country. 
The literature has noted that, while some countries enjoy high levels of  trust in e-voting, 
this has not quashed objections based on security issues – this resulted in the halting of  
e-voting in Switzerland until upgrades to the available online voting systems are made. 
We will have an opportunity to delve into the security issues in the last section but 
for now, we will focus on the judicial complaints that they have given rise to. In both 
Switzerland and Estonia, judicial cases were lodged alleging potential security breaches 
in the underlying systems supporting e-voting. In both cases, the complaints were 
dismissed by the national courts on the grounds that actual breaches had to be proven 
for results to be invalidated, with the courts declining to perform an overall assessment 
of  systems and their compatibility with electoral laws.28 The same was not the case in 
Germany and in Austria, where the Constitutional Courts considered that one of  the 
fundamental elements of  the electoral system is the electorate’s ability to adequately 
verify the validity of  their vote without the need to have specialised knowledge – this 
applies to the electoral commission, in the Austrian case, with the Constitutional Court 
considering that the electoral commission should be able to perform their duty without 
outside technical help.29
Aleksandr Lust insightfully remarks that, regarding the EU, the conditions 
governing the ability and willingness of  citizens to use the internet and digital tools 
vary wieldy across the Member States, which would give rise to a very heterogenous use 
of  the tool in the continent. The author also expresses his concern, about the ethnic 
division that became apparent in Estonia and the negative effect that e-voting could 
have on those European societies which deal with considerable socioeconomic, ethnic 
and religious divisions (exemplifying with Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia), 
which could be deepened by the implementation of  online voting, as was the case in 
Estonia.
27 Aleksander Lust, “I-Vote, therefore I am?”, 66.
28 Georg Aichholzer and Gloria Rose, “Experience with digital tools in different types of  
e-Participation”, 110.
29 Ardita Driza Maurer and Jordi Barrat, eds., e-Voting case law: a comparative analysis (New York: 




® UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL  Vol. 7, No. 1,  July 2021
75 Miguel Pereira
Georg Aichholzer and Gloria Rose seem to echo some of  these concerns, stating 
that the EU should focus on improving the existing methods, experimenting with 
new forms of  participatory democracy that depart from the more State-centered 
models and to focus on building the European Parliament and its parliamentarians 
as bridges to the EU and conduits for the general population to have an impact on 
policy making.30
2.3. E-participatory budgeting: a way forward?
Participatory budgeting has been around since 1989, when it was introduced in 
Porto Alegre, Brazil, and it allows for citizens to take part in the decisions regarding 
the budgeting of  fractions of  the municipal budget. E-participatory budgeting is 
the latest stage of  its development, allowing for the citizens’ contributions to be 
provided through digital media tools.
Participatory budgeting may take different forms, with some being actual 
decision-making processes, others having a non-binding, consultive, nature which 
contributes to shaping the final decision taken by the representatives in charge of  
preparing the budget.31 This instrument has been adopted throughout the world with 
many municipalities in Europe implementing it and making 1-20% of  the municipal 
budget available for this purpose. Georg Aichholzer and Gloria Rose synthesised 
the impacts that participatory budgeting has garnered in Europe, highlighted in the 
relevant literature, as follows: “support for the demand for increased transparency, improved 
public services, accelerated administrative operations, better cooperation amongst public administration 
units and enhanced responsiveness. Positive contributions to the political culture and competences of  
participants can also be expected. This can include extended participation opportunities, enhanced 
transparency of  public policy, better quality of  decision-making, increased legitimacy and a stronger 
identification with the local community. Cost reduction and major structural reforms are less likely 
achieved.”32
The general note in the studies that were reviewed by these authors is incredibly 
positive, with impacts being measurable in increased quality of  public services and 
increased trust in local government, though always through a combination of  online 
and offline participation to achieve optimal results. The authors also noted a lack 
of  integration with social media, whose engagement is perceived to be a potentially 
positive contribution to e-participatory budgeting. There have also been some 
successful cases of  implementation of  gamification in e-participatory budgeting 
(though, in some cases, some less positive outcomes have also been detected, such as 
distancing from other political channels such as public protest and campaigning).33 
In general, we believe that enticing designs and features that promote engagement 
with the e-participatory budgeting tools are welcome (though not all of  the features 
usually associated with gamifying seem adequate in the context of  a digital democracy 
30 Georg Aichholzer and Gloria Rose, “Experience with digital tools in different types of  
e-Participation”, 130.
31 Georg Aichholzer and Gloria Rose, “Experience with digital tools in different types of  
e-Participation”, 107.
32 Georg Aichholzer and Gloria Rose, “Experience with digital tools in different types of  
e-Participation”, 108.
33 John Gastil and Michael Broghammer, “Linking theories of  motivation, game mechanics, and 
public deliberation to design an online system for participatory budgeting”, Political Studies, v. 69, no. 
1 (2021): 7-25.
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instrument, such as “leader scoreboards” identifying the most active participants),34 
though special care must be taken to prevent or, at least, curb the impact of  the 
potential negative side effects we adduced to above, and to prevent the trivialisation 
of  e-participatory budgeting instruments through pure game formats. 
It seems that this type of  direct intervention is, so far, the best placed to advance 
participatory democracy and has certainly benefited from digital tools (cost and time 
saving). We will explore this possibility in our concluding remarks.
3. Threats: information security and social media 
We have dedicated the last section to exploring some of  the digital democracy 
instruments that have been put to the test across Europe. While not covering all 
the uses that digital tools and digital media might have in the context of  online 
democratic practice, we highlighted those that revealed a closer connection to the 
EU, that benefit more from (or were made possible by) digital tools and whose 
connection to direct participatory democracy is clearer. 
The weaknesses and threats we will explore in this section do not relate 
exclusively to those instruments that were reviewed (though they are applicable as 
well). They result from the introduction into our daily lives of  digital tools that, while 
connecting the most remote parts of  the world to the unimaginably immense wealth 
of  knowledge that the internet comprises and allowing for an unparalleled leap in 
the development of  societies across the world, represent an increasing danger to 
the stability and transparency of  democratic political systems, much to the contrary 
of  the early expectations that technological development created in our collective 
consciousness. 
3.1. Information Security
Thomas Rid and Ben Buchanan35 make a very critical appraisal of  how the 
“cyber security”36 community failed to identify the ways by which malicious actors 
might try to undermine democracy, by focusing the discussion on antiquated views 
on the potential that digital tools present and converging the efforts on targets which 
present a more literal danger than those that, nowadays, are being exploited (the 
traditional example would be hacking the power grid to sew chaos). Indeed, while 
attacks on those classic targets still represent a great threat to the stability of  any 
nation, current events have shown how the tactics that are currently being deployed 
are much more insidious. The 2016 US election brought the issue of  foreign election 
meddling to the forefront of  concerns with democracy, with a US Department 
of  Justice investigation revealing a coordinated disinformation campaign allegedly 
orchestrated out of  Russia, which was coupled with successful hacking of  political 
campaigns, resulting in damaging information being released.37 While the question 
of  the actual game changing impact it had on the results might never be known, the 
34 John Gastil and Michael Broghammer, “Linking theories of  motivation”, 8.
35 Thomas Rid and Ben Buchanan, “Hacking democracy”, SAIS Review of  International Affairs, v. 38, no. 
1 (2018): 3-16, https://doi.org/10.1353/sais.2018.0001. 
36 According to the authors, even the designation cyber security is contentious in the debate, with 
recent trends adopting the expression “information security”, which does seem more adequate.
37 See, Abigail Abrams, “Here’s what we know so far about Russia’s 2016 meddling”, Time, April 18, 
2019, https://time.com/5565991/russia-influence-2016-election/.
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uncovering of  this operation shows us how fragile democracy can be in the face of  
a few hackers and “internet trolls” with a mission.38 
As the two authors note, the real target of  digital attacks on democracies are 
not the networks themselves, but rather the institutions which make use of  them 
– institutions whose functioning is based on trust. These institutions comprise 
not only political parties, campaigns and public bodies but cover also civil society 
organisations, which fight for the advancement and protection of  human rights.39/40
The next target is the democratic infrastructure, specifically that connected 
to the electoral system. The potential risks that were identified were the tampering 
with digital voter registration records (which could allow, for instance, for a deletion 
of  a portion of  the registered voters, an action which, if  targeting specific groups, 
could have a considerable impact on election results) and voting machines (from 
simple malfunctions to adulteration of  the tallying of  the votes).41 In the context of  
e-voting, as we had a chance to review, the confidence in the durability of  the system 
is not unshakable, so much so, that Switzerland has decided to discontinue e-voting 
until sufficient security upgrades are made to the online voting systems (vide supra).
Finally, a more traditional approach is to target intelligence agencies directly 
with a view not only to steal valuable information and technology, but also to 
discredit them and create barriers to their functioning. The data leaks that brought 
the NSA’s mass surveillance program to light allowed us to have a better sense of  
how this agency collected its information, in a way which seems to be at odds with 
the general public’s legitimate expectation of  privacy. While we can list the benefits 
of  this disclosure, little attention is dispensed to the nefarious results that it also 
comprised. The leaks not only attacked the agency’s credibility in the eyes of  those 
that it set out to protect, but also made it practically and politically difficult for the 
agency to keep using this tool. Even if  the implementation of  safeguards regarding 
its use were, undeniably, in order, one cannot overlook the defensive potential the 
tool had, nor the absolutely central role the NSA plays in the collective defense of  
the NATO Member States, with this agency being the most capable amongst all 
the western democracies and frequently sharing advanced warnings with the NATO 
allies regarding terrorist plots and espionage campaigns.42 A balance must be struck 
between overarching policing of  innocent bystanders and the need for democracies 
38 The year was also marked by the Brexit referendum by which a small majority of  electors voted 
to oust the United Kingdom out of  the EU. In 2018 a story broke out linking the referendum to yet 
another campaign, allegedly organized by a private contractor, Cambridge Analytica, based on targeted 
advertising through the usage of  data obtained through a breach of  Facebook’s user data. A recent 
report, resulting from a 3-year investigation by the UK’s Information Commissioner, however, revealed 
that the company “was not involved” in the referendum. As no explanation has been provided on how 
the detailed allegations came to light, and given the contradicting report by the supervisory authority, we 
will not include it in our review: https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-54457407. 
39 Thomas Rid and Ben Buchanan, “Hacking democracy”, 9. They give the example of  a member of  
Human Rights Watch, a prominent figure in the United Arab Emirates, which was target by spyware, 
enabling the UAE’s government to track his moves and activities, eventually leading to his arrest. 
40 As regards civil society organizations, it has been noted that the information security threats that 
they’re exposed to go vastly underreported, in comparison to private entities, see Lennart Maschmeyer, 
Ronald J. Deibert and Jon R. Lindsay, “A tale of  two cybers - how threat reporting by cybersecurity 
firms systematically underrepresents threats to civil society”, Journal of  Information Technology & Politics, 
v. 18, no. 1 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1080/19331681.2020.1776658.
41 Thomas Rid and Ben Buchanan, “Hacking democracy”, 10-11.
42 Thomas Rid and Ben Buchanan, “Hacking democracy”, 12-13.
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to be protected from malicious attacks. Finally, the leaks contained more than just a 
warning of  the NSA’s actions, among the throve of  documents were the blueprints 
to the program which have since been adapted to produce the notorious ransomware 
known as “WannaCry” that in 2017 wreaked havoc across the world, among others43.
The information security threats keep evolving, with the recent SolarWinds 
attack bringing new frailties to light. Unlike the traditional approach of  attacking 
the end user, the intended target, one of  the techniques used in this attack targeted 
the software supply-chain, infecting one of  SolarWinds’ systems (Orion), and 
spreading the malicious code through the systems of  the company’s clients via an 
inoffensive looking software update, resulting in multiple US Federal Agencies facing 
an unprecedent security breach.44
3.2. Social media
We have already broached the hazardous potential that social media has for 
democratic life, by allowing for disinformation to seep into our social and news 
feeds. The calls to regulate social media are piling up, and are well founded,45 but, as 
Ronald Deiber notes, for any such regulation to be achieved, a shared understanding 
of  the risks we are looking to mitigate must be reached.46
The fact remains that their business model presents a challenge to modern 
day democracies, a business model that can be included in what Shoshana Zuboff  
has dubbed “surveillance capitalism”.47 When a company makes money out of  data 
collection, their main goal is to keep users connected to their tools for as long as 
they can so that the data collected on each individual user is as granular as possible. 
Many artifices are deployed to fulfill this goal, from design features (such as the 
infinite scroll, which keeps users hooked without any effort on their part) to content 
related functionalities (tailored suggestions). This last one resulting is an effect 
known as “filter bubble”,48 leading users to comfortable echo chambers free of  any 
information or discourse with which the user might disagree. This functionality read 
in conjunction with the low quality of  the discourse to be found on social media, 
mostly based on monologues as opposed to dialogues, excluding any meaningful 
exchange of  positions, does nothing in the way of  fostering democratic discourse 
and mutual understanding.49
43 Thomas Rid and Ben Buchanan, “Hacking democracy”, 12.
44 Laura Hautala, “SolarWinds not the only company used to hack targets, tech execs say at hearing”, 
CNET, February 24, 2021, https://www.cnet.com/news/solarwinds-not-the-only-company-used-
to-hack-targets-tech-execs-say-at-hearing/.
45 The recent actions by social media companies, in the wake of  the Capitol insurrection following 
the 2020 US presidential elections, blocking the then sitting President of  the US from their platforms 
raised some concerns as to the legitimacy that a handful of  board members of  tech-giant have to close 
off  a means of  communication between an elected official and his constituency. This feeds into the 
larger discussion around social media policing and freedom of  speech.
46 Ronald J. Deibert, “The road to digital unfreedom: three painful truths about social media”, Journal 
of  Democracy, v. 30, no. 1 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2019.0002. 
47 The author offers several definitions of  surveillance capitalism, we translate here the first meaning 
she attributes to it: “A new economic order which appropriates human experience and uses it covertly 
as raw material in commercial practices of  extraction, forecasting and sales”, see Shoshana Zuboff, 
“A definição”, in A era do capitalismo de vigilância: a disputa por um futuro humano na nova fronteira do poder 
(Lisbon: Relógio D’Água, 2020).
48 Ronald J. Deibert, “The road to digital unfreedom”, 32. 
49 Ralph Linder and Georg Aichholzer, “e-Democracy: conceptual foundations and recent trends”, 
31-32.
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Social media companies find themselves frequently in the midst of  scandals 
which expose the threats that their business models have created and yet, have found 
very few ways to mitigate those threats. The pile of  anecdotal examples keeps on 
getting bigger but a good example of  their failure to prevent misinformation and 
disinformation from spreading can be found in the experiment conducted by a group 
of  researchers that posed as Russian  trolls (using elements to connect their online 
presence to the Internet Research Agency, one of  the entities identified behind the 
2016 disinformation campaign surrounding the US Presidential election, an entity 
which is currently under sanctions by the US) and easily managed to buy ads from 
Google., indicating lacking due diligence measures when it comes to accepting new 
advertisers.50
Their potential to be used to whip up hatred that spills out onto the street has 
already been proven, with Facebook activity being connected to the violence in the 
context of  the ethnic cleansing of  Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar.51 The troubling 
new developments are the use of  WhatsApp for disinformation spreading purposes.52 
Given the app’s characteristics, taking any action in this regard will prove difficult.
While it is true that a lot of  the issues surrounding the use of  social media 
are not connected to the way they operate (or intend to operate) their business, but 
rather to their use by agitators and malicious actors, given their increased importance 
in public life, the mounting concern with the activities that are enabled by these 
platforms, the real life consequences that they have and their increased globalised 
presence, it seems like the time has come to start debating the next steps on the 
regulation of  the sector, looking to strike a balance between the need to mitigate 
these risks, the users’ right to freedom of  expression and the companies’ right to 
private initiative. 
Again, the EU finds itself  in a privileged position to spearhead such regulatory 
efforts. The ability to harmonise legislation across 27 Member States (and to influence 
the legislation of  many other States that wish to do business with the bloc) is not only 
an advantage but seems like it might be a necessity, when it comes to regulating global 
tech giants. Reaching international consensus on standards that these companies 
must adhere to would prove to be more that an agonizingly cumbersome process 
but rather, an impossible task. The EU’s particular functioning allows for most of  
those hurdles to be side stepped, at least as concerns the territory of  its Member 
States (already a sizable portion of  the biggest social media platforms’ users and 
revenue generators). The Commission has recently seized upon this opportunity and 
put forward proposals for the adoption of  two Regulations (the Digital Services Act 
and the Digital Market Acts) which, among other things, seeks to address some of  
the issues that we have highlighted in this section.53 The proposals have yet to be 
approved but the legislative process is ongoing and, if  approved, both Regulations 
would take effect across the EU and potentially influence other States to follow suit. 
50 Ronald J. Deibert, “The road to digital unfreedom”, 33.
51 Ronald J. Deibert, “The road to digital unfreedom”, and Dipayan Gosh, Terms of  disservice, 
Introduction.
52 Ronald J. Deibert, “The road to digital unfreedom”, 33.
53 European Commission, “Proposal for a regulation of  the European Parliament and of  the Council 
on a Single Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/
EC”, Brussels, 15 December 2020, COM(2020) 825 final and European Commission, “Proposal for 
a regulation of  the European Parliament and of  the Council On contestable and fair markets in the 
digital sector (Digital Markets Act)”, 15 December 2020, COM(2020) 842 Final.
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4. Concluding remarks
The concept of  “democratic deficit” is one that has, for a long time, plagued the 
EU and the functioning of  its institutions. Many saw the rise of  digital democracy 
as a potential answer to that. While we agree that the EU’s functioning often lacks a 
certain, undesirable, degree of  transparency (the issue with the lack of  transparency 
of  trilogues and the unusual way by which the Commission is nominated are good 
examples54), we shared the view of  Alessandra Silveira that, when put to the standard 
tests a democratic institution should pass, the EU does not fail.55 In our view, the EU’s 
primary challenge is one of  communication. Its struggle to get out the many initiatives 
it has spearheaded, whose contributions are felt by its citizens but which they cannot 
link to its rightful source is no doubt its main weakness. Alexis Vhalas aligns with this 
perspective, questioning the reasons for the EU citizens’ freedom to circulate, work, 
settle and study in the full span of  its territory not to be hailed as the great achievement 
that it is. The same rationale applies to the EU’s efforts on the international stage, 
where, in the last 15 years, it has deployed more civilian and military operations than 
“any other international organization, far ahead of  the UN, OSCE and NATO”.56
In our view, increased recourse to digital democracy tools, which foster participative 
democracy, contribute not only to the democratic development of  our society but will 
certainly help the EU get its message across more clearly and effectively, allowing its 
citizens to directly link the EU’s initiatives to the changes in their environment. 
We believe that the first steps should be taken at the local level, using the 
aforementioned mechanism of  participatory budgeting. While participatory budgeting 
is, now, focused on funding projects that find their inception in citizen’s initiatives, 
we argue that that their scope could be expanded to cover more traditional areas of  
autarchic involvement which relate to public utilities. Local assemblies are called upon 
each year to decide on the amount of  funds that are to be granted to local public 
services, and this often involves deciding on which of  these should get the biggest slice 
of  the budget with a view to improve those services or address specific needs that have 
been identified. This type of  debate provides an avenue not only to attract citizens 
to local decision making (no specific political knowledge is needed and the impact 
of  the decisions is felt directly and more immediately), but also to address the needs 
that they register in their daily lives. Whom better than those that use the city buses 
and the city’s trash collection system to decide on whether they need improvement or 
not? The funding for these services cannot, naturally, be entirely dependent on public 
voting (nor should this be done exclusively online, a combination of  online and offline 
methods would maximize results, as we’ve seen above) as the externalities related to 
voter representation we have  addressed (here, further compounded by whether voters 
use or not these public utilities) should be contained, but the decision on whether a 
larger portion of  the budget should be allocated to their improvement should certainly 
take into account the views of  the population.
Engaging people locally could be the first step to improve their involvement at 
a larger scale. This would allow electors a chance to see the palpable change their 
votes can have in their surrounding environment. Further to that, it contributes to 
their education as electors, giving them an opportunity to be called upon more often 
54 Tiago Sérgio Cabral, “A short guide to the legislative procedure in the European Union”, 179-180.
55 Alessandra Silveira, Princípios de direito da União Europeia, 60-62.
56 Alexis Vahlas, “The European Union as a new kind of  federalism”, in Federalismo em tempos de 
Renacionalização, 233.
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and to more directly be held accountable for their decisions. Evidence has also shown 
that positive experiences with e-participation and government responsiveness resulted 
in increased levels of  trust in local government.57 There are chances for the EU to 
seize on this opportunity, either by creating funds in support of  the enhancement of  
local e-participatory budgeting (attaching a clear obligation of  promoting the source 
of  those funds) or, in the long run, dedicating portions of  its own funds and budget 
to this type of  mechanism (an option that, we would presume, would require delicate 
political negotiation but is a position which could be reinforced if  citizens were specially 
engaged in participatory budgeting initiatives).
From the considerations we gathered throughout the paper, it seems that, for 
the moment, focus should remain with strengthening existing mechanisms (such as, 
e-participatory budgeting and the ECI). Either way, any attempt to move towards a 
more digitised democracy should be preceded by initiatives to increase digital literacy 
and access to digital tools across the EU, as the Member States, at this stage, present 
rather heterogeneous realities in what concerns ability with and availability of  digital 
tools.
In what regards the threats that were identified, particular attention should be 
given to information security. Thomas Rid and Ben Buchanan highlight the fact that 
the NSA leaks also showed us that the western democracies have better operational 
security than their Russian and Chinese counterparts58 and it seems that the issue 
was that they were looking the wrong way. Increased attention should be given to 
disinformation, misinformation and hacking campaigns, especially around electoral 
events. Now that malicious actors’ capacity to impact democracy has been proven, the 
temptation to keep trying will be there. 
Finally, concerning social media, we expect the debate on their regulation to 
intensify in the coming months, with the unfolding of  the discussion surrounding 
the Digital Services and Digital Markets Acts. Regulation seems, more than ever, a 
necessity. For as much as social media has created spaces which allowed for autocracies 
to be taken down and fostered connections across the globe that would not be possible 
without them, it has also resulted in unprecedented threats to our democracy, our 
society, and our freedom. The irony is that their business model, by its own nature, 
thrives in a society littered with disinformation, as Dipayan Gosh notes: “there is an 
implicit alignment in the commercial goals of  Facebook and the persuasive goals of  the Russian 
disinformation operators. Both desire the user’s maximal engagement with the content at hand (..) we 
cannot ignore the economic alignment of  their objectives”.59
Like with all other aspects of  our lives, technology is starting to permeate 
democracy. It is paramount that the EU stays ahead of  this evolution and manages to 
curate the most adequate mechanisms by which digital democracy will be a part of  its 
future, adapting the latter’s concepts to its own peculiarities, in the hopes that it might 
help to assuage the disenfranchisement that accelerated globalisation and digitalisation 
has brought about. 
57 Soonhee Kim and Jooho Lee, “e-Participation, transparency and trust in local government”, Public 
Administration Review, v. 76, no. 6 (2012): 819-828, seen in Leonhard Hennen et al., European e-Democracy 
in practice, 96.
58 Thomas Rid and Ben Buchanan, “Hacking democracy”, 6.
59 Dipayan Gosh, Terms of  disservice, Introduction.
